ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW by unknown
670 .TE YALE LAW JOURNAL. [Vol. 46: 670
it is pparently capable as administered of achieving the ends contemplated
for it. If Congress decides to continue the policy of the Act when it expires
on June 12, 1937;-change of administrative methods by amendment seems
unnecessary 3 0
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW
TnE DISCUSSION of university affairs provoked by two recent incidents-
Yale University's failure to reappoint Jerome Davis as Associate Professor
in the Divinity School,' and the dismissal of Glenn Frank as President of
the University of Wisconsin2 - suggests an examination of what the law
can do to protect academic freedom. Despite the unanimity with which edu-
ators.profess their faith in the ideal of an incfependent scholarship,3 it is
clear that some university teachers have been dismissed for their opinions,
and that many are inhibited in what they say and write on socially controver-
sial issues, and in their political activity as citizens, by the fear of academic re-
prisals.4 The forces which narrow the area within which a university teacher
is reasonably free to think and act as he likes are more or less intangible:
the pressure of protests against radicalism from trustees, alumni, and from
the community at large; the possibilities of political interference in the
academic affairs of state and municipal universities;O and the difficulties of
130. For general expressions of approval, see N. Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1936, § 3, p. 9,
col. 4; id. Jan. 4, 1937, p. 61, col 4, 5; id. Jan. 18, 1936, p. 19, col. 8.
1. Yale on Trial, 89 NEw REPUBLic, pt. 2 (Nov. 18, 1936); Shukotoff, Yale and
Academic Freedom, Nmv MrASSES, Jan. 5, 1937, p. 18; Henderson, Facully Sell-Govern-
ment (letter) YALE ALUMNI WEEILY, Nov. 27, 1936, p. 9; id. Nov. 20, 1936, p. 8.
2. N. Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1937, p. 1, col. 5.
3. BEwr, Aim AxErIcAN TEACHERS Fams? (1936) 740-778; Eliot, Academic
Freedom (pamph., Press of Andrus and Church, Ithaca, N. Y., 1907); Cook, Academic
Freedom (1936) 22 BuLL. or AmecA" Ass'r or UNVERsITy PioFEssoRs 248. But see
statement made by the executive vice-president of Renssalaer Polytechnic Institute fol-
lowing the dismissal of Granville Hicks from the faculty for his political views: "We
adhere to an unwritten regulation of long standing that there shall be excluded from
our classrooms all controversial discussions about politics, religion and sociology," and,
after affirming the Instittte's adherence to the capitalist system: "I think we shoula
stand four-square to the world and declare our faith." (1936) 22 BULL. A.A. U. P. 18.
4. See, in general, (1932) 18 BuLL. A. A. U. P. 333; FLEXN R, Umvmasrrxss,
Ar.E\ECAN, ENGLISn, GEMuAN (1930) 180. "The contention that they [business men
trustees] suppress freedom of speech cannot, I believe, be sustained, except in rare
instances and in inconspicuous or inferior institutions. But in social and economic
realms they create an atmosphere of timidity which is not -without effect in initial
appointments and in promotions.'
5. This was alleged to have been a moving force in Yale's failure to retain Jerome
Davis. Yale on Trial, loc. cit. iupra, note 1.
6. It .has been alleged, thiit 'the dismissal of President Frank was motivated by
his joliiical "differences with Governor La Follette. New York Times, Jan. 7, 1937,
p. 1, col. 3.
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administering an institution which reqdires public support, if the views of
its staff deviate too conspicuously from accepted norms of conduct or opinion.
Under some circumstances the operation of such forces is too obscure and too
confused with other issues to be persuasively identified; those who raise the
cry of academic freedom may, of course, be persons against whom there are
objections of academic mediocrity or incompetence more serious than the
heterodoxy of their views On occasion, however, a clear-cut scandal occurs,
unequivocally based on a restriction of academic freedom, and culminating in
a dismissal or a reduction of pay, for which the teacher seeks redress either
through an organization like the American Association of University Pro-
fessors,s or occasionally through the courts.0
It is extremely difficult to frame a legal action through which the courts
can give relief against such unwarrantable limitations on academic freedom.
Academic freedom .is not a "property" right, or a constitutional privilege,
or even a legal term defined by a history of judicial usage and separately
listed in the digests and Words and Phrases. Moreover, where a case is
brought presenting the consequences of an interference with academic freedom
in justiciable form, and petitioning for an accepted mode of legal relief, the
.plaintiff.faces the added barrier of a profession of judicial reluctance ° to
intervene in the internal affairs of an educational institution," an attitude
which is said to limit the court to an ex~m-ination of the authority, not the
propriety, of administrative action.
An interference with a teacher's freedom of action most obviously ap-
proaches justiciable form if it results in an interference with the terms of his
employment. Employment of college teachers depends in the United States
largely upon the grace of non-academic administrative boards, subject to
many conflicting- pressures, not, as in England, upon the judgment of
academic colleagues.12 Although under the American system guarantees of
academic freedom to the teacher do not come as a matter of right, a recent
survey of America's leading colleges and universities" z reports that some
7. See BnALB., op. cit. mtpra note 3, at 748; Dewey, Academic Freedom (1902),
23 EDuc. REv. 8.
S. See infra p. 676 ct seq.
9. See infra p. 672 et seq., p. 632 ct seq.
10. See note 30 and p. 635 infra.
11. For analogous situations, see Chafee, The Intenal Affairs of Associations 1ot
for Profit (1930) 43 HRv. L. Rsv. 993, 99S; Comment (1936) 45 YAx. L. J. 1248,
1260.
12. Afomsox, Tns FouNDrNG or HAnvAnD CoaE.a (1935) 19, 33, 82; Cainbridgc
University, 4 ExcYc. Bmr. (14th ed. 1929) 654; Oxford Univrsity, 16 Eucyc. Barr.
(14th ed. 1929) 997; Fx.xNL , op. cit. sipra note 4, at 268; Reed, The Salaried Pro-
fessor in the Learned Professions (1934) 29 AmuAr. Rromor 0 aE iCu&m
FOUNDATioN FoR THE ADVANcezEmN op TEAcHm 35, 40 et scq.; Reed, Contribution
of the Mfedieval University to American Higher Education (1936) 31 id., 50, at 59.
13. Study of Tenure of University and College Teachers, Summary of Report,
(1932) IS Bum. A.A.U. P.255. Questionnaires were sent to the 3S9 institutions
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institutions appoint teachers in the higher academic ranks of their faculties on
a permanent basis and provide for faculty participation iii dismissal pro-
ceedings. Such policy, however, has not been universal;14 for many institu-
tions consider the teacher simply an employee and refuse either to appoint
any faculty members for more than a short term or to consider faculty advice
on renewal of existing contracts.' 5
Where legal redress has been sought for interferences with academic em-
ployment, the action has generally been based on allegations of wrongful
dismissal, often at least suggestive of an underlying issue of academic free-
dom, not discussed by the court. The commonest fact situation in these
cases is that of a teacher, appointed for a definite term, who has been dis-
missed before the end of that term. The relief sought has varied: some plain-
tiffs asked damages for breach of contract, others sought the restoration of
their positions. Those actions for damages have generally involved public
institutions whose governing boards were vested by statute or by-law with
the power to discharge faculty members at their discretion. This grant of
power has invariably proved decisive; for the courts have uniformly held
that it entered into and formed a part of the, plaintiff's contract of employment
and rendered him subject to removal at any time.'0 Reluctant to upset the
approved by the American Association of University Professors. 292 replies were
received of which nine were too incomplete to be included in the report.
14. Despite safeguards to his freedom, even the full professor is not always safe.
For flagrant examples of discharge see (1924) 10 Bu.. A. A. U. P. 50; (1931) 17 BuLL.
A. A. U. P. 443; (1933) 19 BuLL. A.A.U.P. 416.
15. Thus President Holt of Rollins College said, when asked to permit a hearing
before faculty members prior to the dismissal of a professor: "Why should I give him a
hearing before anyone else? When you want to fire a cook, you don't go out and get
a committee of the neighbors to tell you what to do, do you?" Rollins College Report
(1933) 19 BuLL. A.A. U.P. 416.
16. Ward v. Bd. of Regents, 138 Fed. 372 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905); Devol v. Bd. of
Regents, 6 Ariz. 259, 56 Pac. 737 (1899) ; State Bd. of Agri. v. Meyers, 20 Colo. App.
139, 77 Pac. 372 (1904) ; Hyslop v. Bd. of Regents, 23 Idaho 341, 129 Pac. 1073 (1913) ;
Bd. of Regents v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 223 (1878); Gillan v. Bd. of Regents, 88 Wis.. 7,
58 N. W. 1042 (1894); State ex rel. Hunsicker v. Bd. of Regents, 209 Wis. 83, 244
N. W. 618 (1932) (mandamus). In University of Miss. v. Deister, 115 Miss. 469, 76 So.
526 (1917), a by-law to the same effect passed by the governing board was held to
work similar result.
The same result has obtained in the case of private institutions whose governing
boards were vested with such power by charter or statute. Queen v. Governors of
Darlington School, 6 Q. B. 682, 115 Eng. Rep. 257 (1844) (mandamus); Hayman v.
Governors of Rugby School, L. R. 18 Eq. 28 (1874) (injunction to restrain removal);
see Trustees of Auburn Academy v. Strong, 1 Hopkins Ch. 278, 282 (N. Y. 1823).
But cf. Willis v. Childe, 13 Beav. 117, (1850); It re Fremington School, Ch. 10 Jurist
512 (1846), Ch. 11 Jurist 424 (1847). But a by-law to this effect might well ba
attacked as ineffective to relieve such institution from contractual liability for an unjust
removal. See State ex rel. Kelsey v. N. Y. Postgraduate Med. School, 29 App. Div.
244, 51 N. Y. Supp. 420 (1st Dep't 1898); Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery,
51 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930) ; Cuppy v. Stollwerck Bros. Inc., 216 N. Y. 591, 111
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administrative rulings of university authorities, most courts have denied
recovery of damages for breach of contract even where dismissal was tin-
justified; 17 and on the ground that a governing board is incapable of divest-
ing itself of its granted power, courts have generally reached the same result
even where the board's action violated one of its own by-laws providing for
a specified notice or hearing.' 8 On the other hand, two courts have ruled
that a statute vesting a governing board with discretion in the matter of
removals confers only the power, but not the privilege, of removing faculty
members prior to the expiration of their terms without cause; and damages
were awarded in each case for breach of contract.10 The opinions in these
cases point out that if a university did not have the power to bind itself for a
definite period, it would be handicapped in its efforts to secure able teachers.20
In three of the cases, however, in which a teacher in a state university
sought contractual redress, dismissal bad been effected by the abolition of
his position by the state legislature prior to the expiration of the term for
which he had been appointed. The theory upon which recovery of salary
was sought in each case was that the legislature's action was an uncon-
stitutional impairment of the obligation of his contract. In each instance
plaintiff's right to relief turned upon the issue of whether he should be classi-
fled as an officer or an employee of the institution he served. Two courts
concluded that the plaintiff held a public office and therefore could not com-
plain of its disestablishment by the legislature, on the ground that no one can
assert a contractual right to a public office.2 ' One court, on the theory that
a professor in a state institution was merely its employee, sanctioned the
recovery of damages.2-
N. E. 249 (1916). Contra: Abberger v. Kulp, 156 fisc. 210, 281 N. Y. Supp. 373
(Sup. Ct. 1935).
17. Ward v. Ed. of Regents, 138 Fed. 372 (C. C.A. 8th, 1905); Devol v. Ed. of
Regents, 6 Ari. 257, 56 Pac. 737 (1S99); State Ed. of Agri. v. Meyers, 20 Colo. App.
139, 77 Pac. 372 (1904) ; Hyslop v. Ed. of Regents, 23 Idaho 341, 129 Pac. 1073 (1913);
Gillan v. Bd. of Regents, 88 Wis. 7, 5S N. NV 1042 (1S94).
18. Devol v. Bd. of Regents, 6 Ariz. 259 (1S99) ; State ex rel. Hunsicker v. Ed. of
Regents, 209 Wis. 83, 244 N. NV. 618 (1932); see Gillan v. Ed. of Regent% 83 ,vis.
7, 13, 58 N. W. 1042, 1044 (1S94). For an extreme holding, see Hartigan v. Ed. of
Regents, 49 W. Va. 14, 38 S. F 698 (1901) (see note 30 infra).
19. State Bd. of AgrL. v. Meyers, 20 Colo. App. 139, 77 Pac. 372 (1904) ; Bd. of
Regents v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 223 (1878) ; see Gottschalck v. Shepperd, 65 N. D. 544, 546,
260 X. W. 573, 575 (1935).
20. But even these cases would limit the period. for which the institution could bind
itself to one "not unreasonably long." See State Ed. of AgrL v. Meyers, 20 Colo. App.
139, 146, 77 Pac. 372, 373 (1904) ; Ed. of Regents v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 223, 230 (I878).
21. V'mcenheller v. Reagan, 69 Ark. 460, 64 S. NV. 278 (1901) ; Head v. Curators
of Univ. of Mo., 47 Mo. 220 (1871), aff'd on other grounds, 19 Wall. 526 (U. S. 1873):
But see Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5, 10 (1880); cf. Rex. v. Univ. of Cambridge,
2 Ld. Raym. 1334, Fort. 201, 92 Eng. Rep. 370, 818 (1724) (Dr. Bentley's Case. See
STRAcnm ~, PoRmAris nI M NATUrm (1931] 59).
22. Butler v. Regents, 32 Wis. 124 (1873).
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The same distinction between officer and employee has proved at least
verbally decisive in the cases in which a teacber sought restoration of his
position by way of mandamus or quo warranto. Where the court described
the teacher as an employee, an extraordinary writ was viewed as unavailable
even if the teacher had been wrongfully dismissed;23 if, on the other hand,
he is considered an officer, he may be reinstated either by mandamus or quo
warranto, whether affiliated with a private or public institution. 24
It seems undesirably mechanical to allow the relief given a wrongfully
dismissed college teacher to be determined by the distinction between an
"officer" and an "employee".= If the teacher affiliated with a public insti-
tution is classified as an officer, he would probably be entirely remediless when
unseated by legislative action, and if he were unjustly discharged by the
institution's governing board, his remedy would be limited to reinstatement.
Where restoration would involve continued service in a hostile atmosphere,
contractual redress would probably be more satisfactory. Conversely, it
would appear equally unsatisfactory to limit the college teacher to redress in
damages for a wrongful discharge by describing him for this purpose as an
employee of the public or private institution he served; for in many cases,
as where the governing board of ah institution had dismissed a teacher against
the wishes ofi its student body and faculty, reinstatement might be a more
appropriate remedy.20
Although the potentialities of judicial 'action in such situations have per-
haps not been fully exploited,27 especially for the breach of implied in
23. People ex rel. Kelsey v. N. Y. Postgraduate Med. School, 29 App. Div. 244,
51 N. Y. Supp. 420 (1st Dep't 1898) (mandamus, private school); Phillips v. Common-
wealth ex rel. James, 98 Pa. 394 (1881) (quo warranto, private institution). See Note
(1931) 75 A.L.R. 1352 (that teacher is generally considered employee).
24. Eason v. Majors, 111 Neb. 288, 196 N. W. 133 (1923) (quo warranto, public
institution). Cf. 2 FLETCER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (rev. and perm. ed. 1931)
§ 365 et seq.
Injunctive relief has sometimes been requested. Lindley v. Davis, 117 Kan. 558,
231 Pac. 1026 (1925) ; Willis v. Chiide, 13 Beav. 117, 51 Eng. Rep. 46 (1850) ; Hayman
v. Governors of Rugby, L. R. 18 Eq. 28 (1874). Here too.the question of the teacher's
status might be significant in regard to the availability of the remedy, for it is generally
stated that equity will not specifically enforce personal service contracts. See Note
(1926) 44 A. L.R. 1443. Injunctive relief has thus been denied to teachers in primary
and secondary public schools. See note 75, infra. But cf. Crisp v. Holden, 54 Sol. 3.
784 (1909).
25. See Notes (1927) 53 A. L. R. 595, (1934) 93 A. L. R. 333.
26. Chancellor Lindley of the University of Kansas, for example, who was arbi-
trarily removed after having been denied injunctive relief, Lindley v. Davis, 117 Kan.
558, 231 Pac. 1026 (1925) (see note 30, infra], was subsequently reappointed by a new
governing board created by the legislature as a result of his dismissal. See ELIOrr
AND CHAmBERS, THE COLLXGES AND THE CoUrTs (Carnegie Foundation for the Advance-
ment of Teaching, 1936) 69. And further, see the College Teacher and the Trade
Union (pamph., College Section of The Teachers Union, Local 5, American Federation
of Teachers, 1936) 29.
27. Attempts have been made, however, to secure redress by a personal tort action
against the parties instrumental in obtaining dismissal. Gottschalck 4. Shepperd,
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fact contracts to renew appointments nominally made for defined terms,sa
it seems unduly optimistic2 D to look to the courts3 D for the development of
effective legal protection for academic freedom, at least pending an improve-
ment in the concrete provisions made for such rights in statutes and cus-
tomary contracts. In the absence of such preliminary definition of the rights
to be enforced, the courts could deal only with the most flagrant invasions
65 N. D. 544, 260 N. W. 573 (1935) (suit vs. members of governing board of a public
institution for "maliciously" removing complainant professor and against president for
maliciously interfering with his means of livelihood, complaint dismissed on the ground
that administrative officers were not personally liable for their discretionary judicial
rulings). But cf. (1935) 34 Micar. L. REv. 113. See also Nelles and Mermin, Holmrs
and Labor Law (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 517, 522 ct seq.
See Darrow v. Briggs, 261 Mo. 244, 169 S. IV. 118 (1914) (action for civil con-
spiracy against persons influential in obtaining discharge of professor for religious
reasons, complaint dismissed as defective). An action for libel or slander is also poten-
tially available.
28. Cf. McLaughlin v. Hall, 61 P. (2d) 1219 (Cal. 1936).
29. Several other types of legal proceeding to obtain judicial protection might
perhaps be found available. One possibility would lie in the jurisdiction of equity to
correct abuses in the administration of charitable trusts. See Printing House v. Trustees,
104 U. S. 711, 727 (1881); Pound, Visitatorial Jurisdction over Corporations in Equity
(1936) 49 HAnv.'L. REv. 369, 374; ZoLUztA=I, Axrnc= LAW oF Cmais (1924)
§ 609 et seq. See Note (1929) 62 A. L.R. 831. In drastic cases the power of the
state to forfeit the charter of a corporation guilty of its misuse might also be invoked.
It has been used to disfranchise so-called "diploma mills." See Note (1927) 46 A. L. R.
1478; ELLOTr & CHAimERs, op. cit. supra note 26, at 205 et seq.
A further possibility might arise from the visitatorial power possessed by the founder
of a charitable trust, or his appointees. See Visitors of Theological Institution v. Trustees
of Andover, 253 Mass. 256, 143 N. E. 900 (1925) ; generally, Zorm xs, op. dt. supra,
§ 603. Ordinarily, however, this power is assigned to the person or group of persons,
usually a corporation, charged with the administration of the trust. Id. § 694 et seq.
Where the state is the donor of a charitable trust it is likewise vested with a power
of visitation. See BA.va-r, STATE COrrnoL OF PRIVATE HIGHR oDuc,r2r (Teachers
College, Columbia University, 1926) 16, 21.
30. See Lindley v. Davis, 117 Kan. 533, 231 Pac. 1026 (1925) (although removal
of chancellor of University of Kansas admittedly resulted from political pressure, court
denied injunction against dismissal). But cf. Smith v. Patterson, 130 Ore. 73, 279
Pac. 271 (1929). The dismissal of President Frank has provoked similar charges of
political interference ;n the part of Governor La Follette. See Lippman, Academic
Freedom in Wisconsin, N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Dec. 17, 1936, p. 25, col 1; N Y.
Times, Dec. 22, 1936, p. 4, col. 2; id. Jan. 7, 1937, p. 1, col. 3, p. 6, col 3. But cf.
Milwaukee Journal, Dec. 17, 1936, p. 18, col. 1. Regarding a "housecleaning" by ex-
Governor Bilbo at the University of Mississippi, see The Gag on Teaching (pamph.
American Civil Liberties Union, rev. ed. 1936) 30.
For a case upholding the discharge of a professor without notice or hearing, not-
withstanding a statute which provided that he could be removed only for "good cause",
see Hartigan v. Bd. of Regents, 49 NV. Va. 14, 33 S. E. 693 (1901). But cf. Note
(1935) 99 A. L. R. 336, 354, and Coinment (1931) SO U. OF PA. L. Rin'. 96, 10D,
For a case in which a wrongfully discharged college professor was granted judicial
redress, see N. Y. Times, Nov 29, 1936, § 1, p. 37, col. 3.
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of academic independence-breach of existing employment contracts by the
discharge of a teacher whose views and activities are repugnant to the govern-
ing board. Moreover, the effective scope of a court in enforcing even such
clear rights is seriously restricted by practical obstacles. The issue of
academic freedom is seldom clearly raised, and in fact is scarcely ever men-
tioned in the cases. Where the power of the governing board to remove is
conditioned upon a showing of just cause and where the official cause assigned
for a given dismissal is the alleged incompetence of the teacher-an issue
upon which scholars in his field are often in sharp disagreement 3 -a question
is presented to the courts which they are conspicuously incompetent to an-
swer. Where a dismissal is merely the failure to renew a term contract,
the difficulties attached to framing an acceptable legal theory on which to
base a cause of action would ordinarily prove insurmountable8 2 Even in
dismissal cases courts find persistent difficulties in attempting to fix appro-
priate limits to administrative discretion to be exercised by governing boards
of universities.33
Since one fundamental reason why courts provide the dismissed teacher
with so forlorn a promise of assistance is the vagueness of the rights for
which plaintiffs in such cases seek judicial protection, it seems clear that
on the legal side, the work to be done in the interest of safeguarding academic
freedom consists mainly of improving the contractual and statutory defini-
tion of teachers' rights.34 The American Association of University Pro-
fessors, whose membership includes a large proportion of the nation's college
faculties,35 has for two decades consistently campaigned, in the interest of
academic freedom30 for the voluntary adoption by the nation's colleges and
universities of substantially the following program: written contracts which
define fully the terms of the teacher's appointment; freedom for the insti-
tution to terminate a short term appointment at its expiration, but only
31. The Jerome Davis case clearly illustrates this point. See Yale on Trial, snpra
note 1. The same issue is involved in the dismissal of Glenn Frank. See N. Y. Times,
Dec. 17, 1936, p. 1, col. 1; p. 6, col. 1; id. Dec. 22, 1936, p. 4, col. 2; id. Jan. 7, 1937,
p. 1, col. 3, pp. 6, 7.
32. This was the procedure taken in the case of Professor Davis. See note 1 su pra.
For a similar instance, see WirmER, THE; N..Auia CAsE (1915); see also the N. Y.
Times, Dec. 4, 1936, p. 5, col. 2. Concerning the effectiveness of the "annual contract"
as a means of curbing teaching freedom, see (1932) 18 BuLL. A. A. U. P. 341.
33. See, e.g., Ward v. Bd. of Regents, 138 Fed. 372, 377 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905).
34. The organizations now doing such work are the American Association of Uni-
versity Professors, the American Federation of Teachers and the American Civil
Liberties Union. See Br.LEu, op. cit. supra note 3, at 691 et seq.; The Gag on Teaching,
tLpra note 30, at 45.
35. For more complete information regarding the work and organization of the
Association, see its monthly bulletin. Concerning its origin, see (1922) 8 BuLL
A. A. U.P. 489.
36. See (1932) 18 BuLL. A..AU.P. 329; The Gag on Teaching, supra note 30,
at 57.
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after consultation with the department concerned, preferably with the
approval of a faculty committee and not without adequate notice to the indi-
vidual involved of the intention to do so; the granting of permanent
tenure to higher ranking members of the faculty; and discharge from a long
term or permanent appointment only after a hearing participated in by the
faculty as well as the governing board.37 In furtherance of its campaign the
Association has adopted the policy of "judicially" investigating those cases
which seem to involve serious infractions of its standards and publishing re-
ports on them.38 Such investigations serve a two-fold purpose. If the charge
of infringement is baseless, the cloud of suspicion is removed from the in-
stitution. If, on the other hand, a serious encroachment has in fact occurred,
not only may the offending institution be exposed to unwelcome publicity,30
but in extreme cases, also may be subjected to the more drastic penalty of
being placed upon a "non-recommended" list, ° which comprises those in-
stitutions from which the Association's members agree not to accept appoint-
ments 41 "until . . . it has given satisfactory evidence of a change of
policy." The "blacklist" is of doubtful efficacy, however, where the ac-
cused institution is large and influential. The tactics of the organization on
the whole have been moderate,43 with reliance for the most part placed upon
the beneficial effects of corrective publicityA'
37. See (1932) 18 Bums. A.A.U.P. 330; The Gag on Teaching, supra note 30,
at 58. Prominent educators have expressed the belief that security of tenure is indis-
pensable for the achievement of academic freedom. See Comniission on Academic Free-
doma and Tenure (1936) 22 Bu. AssocrAzou orA &mac, CorLrLES 202; Eliot, Mpra
note 3, at 6; Hutchins, The Professor Pays (1932) 18 Bmz.. A. A. U. P.19. That tenure
inevitably protects the incompetent teacher is not generally regarded as a sufficient
reason for opposing it. See B.E, op. cit. supra note 3, at 749; (1922) 8 Bu. A. A.
U. P. 547. Cf. (1932) 18 Bul. A. A. U. P. 341.
38. Such an investigation is being conducted in the case of Professor Davis. See
N. Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1936, p. 12, col. 5. Concerning the initiation of this practice,
see (1922) 8 Burz_ A. A. U. P. 503. For summaries of the reports of The investigations
from 1924-1931, see (1932) 18 BuLz. A. A. U. P. 348 et seq. Full reports are carried
in current issues as soon as they are completed. See also the list of dismissal cases
involving alleged infringements of academic freedom in The Gag on Teaching, stpra
note 30, at 34 et seq.
39. See (1922) 8 BUz. A. A. U. P. 509. Where, however, the desired results can
be secured without resorting to publication, the findings of the investigating committees
are not reported. See (1932) 18 Buzs.. A. A. U. P. 340, 343.
40. See (1932) 18 Bu.L. A. A. U. P. 359.
41. See The Gag on Teaching, supra note 30, at 33.
42. (1932) 18 Bum. A. A. U. P. 359. The institutions so listed in Jan. 1936 in-
cluded Rollins College, The United States Naval Academy, Brenau College, and the
University of Pittsburgh. See The Gag on Teaching, stpra note 30, at 33.
43. See BE.m, op. cit. sipra note 3, at 691.
44. See (1932) 18 Bum. A. A. U. P. 336; (1922) 8 Buw.. A. A. U. P. 509.
For a critical analysis of the Association's methods, see Bw. , op. cit. stpra note 3, at
691 et seq.
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More recently, the American Federation of Teachers, an affiliate of the
American Federation of Labor," has assumed an increasingly important
position in the field of higher education. Originally established to urge on
behalf of the primary and secondary school teacher principles similar to those
advocated by the American Association of University Professors, it now
includes a growing number of college and university locals in its member-
ship."0 More militant than the American Association of University Pro-
fessors, it believes that the freedom of the teacher can best be guarded by
"an organization that will not merely define standards but will seek to enforce
them . . . , that will n6t nierely characterize a certain teacher's dismissal
as unjust but will fight to have an unjustly dismissed teacher reinstated." 47
The by-law proposed by its New York local to the Board of -igher Educa-
tion of New York City for adoption in connection with the recently enacted
statute establishing tenure in the City's public colleges 4 may be contrasted
with the program of the American Association of University Professors.
More elaborate, it provides in essence that the services of a teacher on short
term appointment may be discontinued solely for incompetence, and then
only after a hearing before a democratically and secretly elected faculty com-
mittee and a subsequent hearing before the Board of Higher Education in
the event that the faculty committee recommends dismissal by a two-thirds
vote.1 Automatic permanent tenure is provided after three years of service,
regardless of rank; and dismissal thereafter is permitted only in accordance
with a procedure similar to that provided for probationers, but set out in
more elaborate detail. 0
45. See generally, BEALE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 706 et seq. The A. A. U. P. is
opposed to the union form of organization, see id. at 672, 708; N. Y. Times, Dec. 30,
1936, p. 11, col. 1.
46. See The College Teacher and the Trade Union, op. cit. su~pra note 26, at 3.
47. Id. at 21. Its methods are well illustrated by its procedure in the Schappes case
at C. C. N. Y., see id. at 29. Its College Committee on Academic Freedom has, already
investigated the Davis case and has submitted a report condemning the action of Yale
University. Press Release, Dec. 28, 1936.
48. N. Y. EDIuc. LAw (1936 Supp.) § 1143. This section incorporates by reference
the tenure statute in regard to public primary and secondary school teachers [N. Y.
EDuc. LAw, § 872] which declares that after a probationary period of three years the
superintendent of schools or the board of superintendents ". . . shall make a written
report to the board of education recommending for permanent appointment those persons
who have been found competent, efficient and satisfactory." It then provides that such
persons shall hold their positions during good behaviour and be dischargeable thereafter
only for good cause after a hearing before the .Board of Education, from whose decision
an appeal may be taken to the courts by certiorari. For a discussion of judicial review
of the rulings of such administrative bodies where no appeal is expressly provided, see
infra p. 684 et seq.
49. That such a requirement may be necessary to render the tenure law effective,
see N. Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1936, p. 5, col. 2.
50. College Section, Local No. 5, American Federation of Teachets, Resolutions and
By-Laws Concerning Tenure.
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Stability of tenure might in the alternative be achieved through the medium
of external compulsion in the form of state legislation. Statutes of this type
are becoming increasingly familiar with respect to public primary and second-
ary schools, 1 and in at least two instances have been directed at public in-
stitutions of higher learning.52 While there ordinarily would seem to be no
question as to the validity of such legislation! 3 when applied to public colleges
and universities,54 its application to privately endowed institutions raises
special problems both of power and of policy. General statutes designed to
establish the principle of tenure in such institutions would be subject to
attack as unconstitutional interferences with the administrative freedom of
college trustees. 5 The validity of those statutes depends upon their reason-
ableness as assessed by the courts, for it has been said that a state has the
power reasonably to regulate private as well as public schools. 0 The con-
cern of the'state with education as an aspect of its police power has long been
recognized,57 and the statutes of a number of states include special provisions
51. See p. 685 infra.
52. N. Y. EDuc. LxW (1936 Supp.) § 1143 (see note 48 pra); Wis. STAT. (1931)
§37.31 (applies to all "state teachers"' colleges and provides permanent tenure after
three years of "successful" probationary service). See State ex rel. Karnes v. Bd. of
Regents, 269 N. W. 284 (Wis. 1936); cf. State ex rel. Hunsicher v. Bd. of Regents,
209 Wis. 83, 244 N. IV. 613 (1932).
53. Generally a state institution of higher learning is completely subject to the
control of the legislature. See ELLIOTT & CmHAmiDs, op. cit. supra note 26, at 146 ct scq.;
BRODY, THE ArmcAN STATE AND HIGHER EDucATroi" (1935) 144 et seq.
In those few cases, however, where the governing board of a state college or uni-
versity is consti itionally vested with unrestricted control, the power of the legislature
to provide for tenure might be questioned on the ground that the governing board within
the scope of its authority was a coordinate branch of the government State v. Chase,
175 Minn. 259, 220 N. W. 951 (1928) ; see State exrel. Black v. State Bd. of Education,
33 Idaho 415, 429, 196 Pac. 201, 204, (1921) ; Regents v. Auditor-General, 167 Mich. 444,
450, 132 N. NV. 1037, 1040 (1911). For a list of institutions enjoying this constitutional
status, see BRODY, supra, at 165 et seq.; Eturr & CmHtmms, mupra, at 134 et zcq.
Such legislation, however, might well be applied even to such institutions under the,
legislature's police power, as distinguished from its inherent regulatory powers over
institutions of its own creation.
54. See, e.g., notes 21 and 22 stpra, for cases where the legislature abolished the
position of profess6rs in state universities. The imposition of additional duties, although
not of an academic nature, on a member of the faculty at a state university has been held
valid. State ex rel. Public Service Comm. of Montana v. Brannon, 86 Mont. 20D, 23
Pac. 202 (1929) ; cf. Fisher v. Bd. of Regents, 10S Neb. 666, 189 N. W. 61 (1922).
55. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923) (invalidating as applied to
private schools statute forbidding teaching of any modem language but English to
pupils below eighth grade); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 263 U. S. 510 (1924)'
(invalidating statute requiring all children between ages of eight and simteen to attend
public school).
56. See Mleyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 402 (1923) ; Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U. S. 510, 534 (1924).
57. Cf. Cochran v. Bd. of Ed., 281 U. S. 370 (1930) (upholding public purpoze
of tax to provide free te.-t books for use in private as well as public schools). Perhaps
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regarding the incorporation of private schools and the conditions on which
they may grant degrees, requiring their adherence to specified academic
standards.58 Nor would legislation regulating the conditions of appointment
of faculty members in privately endowed institutions be entirely novel; for
a substantial number of the much criticized teachers' oath laws apply to
private institutions.50 Legislation in regard to the appointment, promotion,
and discharge of faculty members in private educational institutions for the
purpose of increasing their security of tenure might more easily be held valid
as kan exercise of the state's reserved power to amend corporate charters.
The Supreme Court adopted this approach in the Berea College case,00 where
a Kentucky statute which forbade the instruction of white persons and
Negroes together was upheld as an amendment of the charter of the com-
plainant college. Statutes upheld solely on this ground, however,' would not
be applicable to those institutions whose charters are not subject to amend-
ment by subsequent legislation.61
the clearest manifestation of this concern is the liberal policy of the states in regard
to the exemption of private schools from taxation. See ZOLLrAN, op. cit. supra note
29, § 757.
For a comprehensive collection of statutes and decisions in this regard, see ELLIOTr
& CHAmBERS, op. cit. mspra note 26, at 302 et seq. In addition, although the practice
is currently less prevalent than was formerly the case, some private institutions receive
actual subsidies from the state. See BARTLETT, op. cit. supra note 29, at 3; ELLIoT'
AND ClAMBnzs, op. cit. supra note 26, at 288 et sreq. That the receipt of public funds
does not alter its private character, see BRoDY, op. cit. supra note 53, at 80 el seq.
But that it may be influential in determining the degree of public control to which it
may be subjected, see note 59 infra.
58. For comprehensive surveys of such regulations see BARTLE=T, op. cit. s pra
note 29; U. S. Office of Ed., Bull. No. 8 (1934); KELLY AND McNEELY, TnE STATE
AND HIGHER EDUCATION (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching,
1933) ; ELLIOTr AND C AMBERS, op. cit. supra note 26, at 179 et seq.
59. Of a total of twenty-one such laws, at least five apply unqualifiedly to private
schools. Coro. ANN. STAT. (Mills 1930) §6767-L; Mass. Laws 1935, c. 370; OxLA.
STAT. (Harlow 1931) § 6815; OrE. CODE ANN. (1930) §35-2403; Vt. Laws 1935, p.
108. Michigan and Washington apply them to all schools receiving any state aid or
tax exemption. Mich. Pub. Acts 1935, p. 34 (prescribing loss of privilege for non-
compliance); WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §§ 4966-1 - 4966-4. New
York's Statute applies to all institutions in whole or in part tax-exempt. N. Y. Euc.
LAw (1936 Supp.) §709. The laws of three states include all institutions in whole
or in part supported by public funds. IND. STAT. ANN. (Bums, Supp. 1929) §§ 7079-1-
7079-4; N. J. Laws 1935, c. 155; N. D: Laws 1931, c. 255. See generally, BEALE, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 65 et seq.; The Gag on Teaching, supra note 30, at 21 et seq.; Gardner
& Post, The Constitutional Questions Raised by the Flag Saltte and Teachers' Oath
Acts in Massachusetts (1936) 16 B. U. L. REv. 803.
60. Berea. College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908).
61. See Trustes of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819).
Since that decision states have expressly reserved the right to amend charters.
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Although teachers' oath0 2 and anti-evolution lawsca and recent legislative
investigations of radical activities in universities" do not inspire confidence
in the state legislatures as solicitous guardians of academic freedom, efforts
to secure the enactment of legislation establishing tenure for teachers in
public colleges and universities should not on that account be discouraged.
Such laws could hardly be criticized as encouraging an extension of legis-
lative interference in the affairs of such educational institutions, which the
legislatures already supervise in many ways, both directly and by way of
control over finances.0 5
The greater independence of the endowed private colleges and universities
and the generally acknowledged interest in perpetuating that independence
make students of the problem hesitate to suggest a reform in their mode of
employment achieved by a special statute. Such schools are almost invariably
independent of the state financially, 0 and the law-maling bodies have general-
ly been circumspect in dealing with them.67 It may be preferable, in the
long run, to avoid steps which might compromise that detachment, depend-
ing for the protection of professors' rights on the efforts of their associations,
the possible e-ample of the states as the custodians of the public colleges and
universities, s and upon an enlightened public opinion. 2
Public Primary and Secondary Schools. Academic freedom is perhaps
more completely an unrealized ideal in the public primary and secondary
schools than in the colleges and universities. Since exemplary conduct is
62. See note 59, supra.
63. Such statutes have been enacted in three southern states with respect to all
schools supported in whole or in part by public funds. 2 Ark. Acts 1929, 1518-1519;
MIss. CODE Aur. (1930) § 7315; TEriN. CODE ( Wll. Shan. & arsh, 1932) §2344
(upheld in Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S. AV. 363 [1927]). Cf. 49 ST.T. 356
(1935) ('i. . no part of any appropriation for the public schools [D. C.] shall be
available for the payment of . . . any person teaching or advocating Communism").
See BEE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 227 et seq. Regarding New York's notoriou post-
war Lusk Laws, see BmALE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 61 cl seq.
64. See The Gag on Teaching, mupra note 30, at 34 (Universities of Chicago and
'Wisconsin in 1935).
.65. State ex reL. Black v. State Bd. of Ed., 33 Idaho 415, 430, 196 Pac. 201, 205
(1921); Regents v. Auditor-General, 167 Mich. 444, 451, 132 N. V. 1037, 1041 (1911).
The Wisconsin Legislature has been charged with attempting to use this form of
pressure. See The Gag on Teaching, mtpra note 30, at 34.
66. A legislature, however, even with respect to private schools might indirectly
exercise a measure of control by threatening to revoke their t-x-exemption privilege.
See especially the Michigan teachers' oath law, supra note 59.
67. None of the anti-evolution laws [supra note 63] and only half of the teachers'
oath laws [supra note 59] for example, apply to such schools.
68. The enactment of tenure legislation for state colleges and universities might
be influential in achieving their voluntary adoption by private schools, since the latter
in such case might find themselves handicapped in competing for the more desirable
teachers.
69. Fm-wm.a, op. cit. mspra note 4, at 345.
19371
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
demanded of the public school teacher, his social as well as intellectual
activities have been subjected to more pervasive restrictions than those which
are imposed upon the college and university teacher.70 The restraints which
have been placed on the school teacher by contract, statute, or by-law of
the employing board range from yellow-dog agreements71 to provisions
against marriage; 72 but even more than by concrete prohibitions, the teacher
has been inhibited by the less tangible coercion.which many bmploying boards
retain through their power to terminate his contract or to fail to employ him
at the end of the contract term. The existence of this power in the employing
board is predicated on a conception of the teacher's status as essentially
similar to that of any private employee. . Although teachers have made re-
current attempts to obtain judicial recognition that their status is unique
because of the responsibilities which they owe to the public, such efforts have
been generally unsuccessful. In, suits for damages for wrongful discharge the
teacher's recovery, in the absence of statute, is held to be the same as that of
any employee,73 and petitions for quo warranto or mandamus to obtain re-
instatement by those wrongfully discharged during the contract term are
refused on the ground that the teacher is not an officer entitled to the use
of the extraordinary writs.74 Furthermore, courts have refused to enjoin
70. BEALE, ARE AmEmRICA TEACHEus FnaR? (1936); Anderson, Hamstrihging
"Our Teachers (1930) 145 ATLAT ic MONTHLY 390; Weltzin, Dare the Teacher
Breathe? (1935) 4 AumcAN SCHOLAR 214.
71. Frederick v. Owens, 25 Ohio Cir. Ct Rep. 581 (1915), aff'd, 95 Ohio St. 407,
116 N. E. 1085 (1916) (resolution of Bd. of Ed. that a teacher's participation in plan
to affiliate grade school teachers' club with A. F. of L. was equivalent to resignation
upheld). Accord: People ex rel. Fursman v. City of Chicago, 278 111. 318, 116 N. E.
158 (1917); Seattle High School Chapter of American Federation of Teachers v.
Sharples, 159 Wash. 524, 293 Pac. 994 (1930). As a result of teacher union activity
the Seattle yellow-dog contract, upheld in the Sharples case, is no longer enforced.
Linville, Yellow Dog Contracts for Teachers (1931) 133 NATiox 13.
72. In the absence of statute a school board may make marriage a ground for-
dismissal by by-law. Backie v. Cromwell Consolidated School Dist., 186 Minn. 38,
242 N. W. 389 (1932); Note (1932) 81 A. L. R. 1033.
73. Freeman v. Bourne, 170 Mass 289, 49 N. E. 435 (1898); Ottinger v. School
Dist., 157 Ark. 82, 247 S. W. 789. (1923). A teacher hired without definite contract
may be dismissed for any reason. Weatherly v. Mayor, etc. City of Chattanooga, 48
S. W. 136 (Tenn. Ch. 1898). But cf. Arnold v. School Dist., 78 Mo. 226 (1883); Bd.
of Ed. v. Cook, 3 Kan. App. 269, 45 Pac. 119 (1896); Taylor v. School Dist., 15
Ariz. 262, 138 Pac. 1 (1914) (teacher entitled to public hearing before dismissal
even though no statutory requirement therefor).
74. Quo Warranto: Comm'r v. Frank, 4 Pa. Co. Ct. 618 (1888). Mandamus:
State ex rel. Leweller v. Smith, 49 Neb. 755, 69 N. W. 114 (1896); State ex el.
Reed v. Bd. of Ed., 100 Wis. 455, 76 N. W. 351 (1898); State ex rel. Sittler v. Bd.
of Ed., 18 N. M. 183, 135 Pac. 96 (1913) ; Mootz v. Belyea, 60 N. D. 471, 236 N. W.
358, 75 A. L. R. 1347 (1931); Morley v. Power, 73 Tenn. 691 (1880) cf. Gilman v.
Bassett, 33 Conn. 298 (1866).
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wrongful discharge because of the policy against specifically enforcing con-
tracts for personal servicesYr
Although thwarted in his efforts to obtain a more favorable status from
the courts, the teacher early found the legislatures more willing to help him.
Voluntary legislative recognition of education as a function of the state,;7
supplemented by direct pressure by teachers' organizations,7 has resulted in
creating for the school teacher a status which, in many states, more nearly
resembles that of the civil servant than the private employee 8 Despite direct
restraints upon academic freedom such as teachers' oath laws70 and despite
occasional abuses of the discretionary power which has been given by statute
to educational authorities,80 the teacher's status when regulated by statute is
more favorable than when he contracts as a free agent.
In some states the statutes provide a standardized contract form which the
local boards must use.81 In this manner the teacher is relieved from the
harsh covenants often demanded by local boardsps s and actual terms of em-
ployment and compensation are clarified. More significant and more widely
adopted are statutory controls over the local board's power of dismissal,
75. School Dist. v. Carson, 9 Colo. App. 6, 46 Pac. 846 (1896); Greer v. Austin,
40 Okla. 143, 136 Pac. 590 (1913) ; cf. Normal School v. Cooper, 150 Pa. 78, 24 At.
348 (1892); Thompson v. Gibbs, 97 Tenn. 489, 37 S. IV. 277 (1895).
76. See Jenkins v. Andover, 103 fass. 94, 97 (1869).
77. The National Education Association, 1201 16th St. N. M, Washington, D. C.,
The American Federation of Teachers, Room 622, 506 S. Wabash Ave., Chicago, Ill.,
The Teachers' Union, 114 E. 16th St., New York City, and various state teachers'
organizations have been especially active in the campaign to secure the teachers'
freedom.
78. See Sc6=, I=-rinnFT TEACHER TENxum (Bureau of Publications, Teachers
College, Columbia University, 1934) 10.
79. A recent survey indicates that at least 21 states require an oath of loyalty
from teachers in their public schools. The Gak on Teaching, op. dr. supra note 30,
at 21.
80. See, for e-ample, the restrictions on union membership and marriage, mtpra
notes 71, 72.
81. A survey shows that of the 22 states which have adopted contract forms, only
8 require their use. Even the state-adopted form is often deficient in failing sp2.
cifically to state the terms and conditions of employment or in leaving some of the
more important elements in the control of the local board. State Adopted Forms for
the Employment of Teachers (pamph., Nat. Ed. Ass'n, Washington, D. C., 1935).
82. See MAinehan, The Teacher Goes Job Hunling (1927) 124 NATio. 605; Teachers'
Contracts (pamph., Nat. Ed. Ass'n, Washington, D. C., 1936); Stevenson, A Stldy of
Forms Used i1 Making Contracts with Public School Teachers (1930) 30 Ermx -r
SCHOOL jour AL 525. A North Carolina Contract drawn by a local board, includes
promises by the teacher not to "go out with any young men except insofar as it may be
necessary to promote my Sunday School work" and not to "fall in love or become secretly
married." Minehan, supra. More common are provisions that the teacher must reside
in the school district during the term, and that he or she will not smoke. Teachers'
Contracts, .upra.
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which cannot be waived by contract or by-law.83 These may take the form
of an enumeration of the causes which will justify dismissal, and discharge
for & cause other than those assigned by statute is generally held a breach
of contract.8" Unfortunately, however, the causes enumerated are typically
couched in broad terms such as "incompetence, inefficiency or other just
cause," so that unless a board acts in a purely arbitrary fashion or fails at
least to lay a foundation for its case in terms of the statute, it is practically
impossible for the teacher to obtain redress for an unjust dismissal. 80 It is
often specifically provided in such statute, and may be implied, that the
teacher must receive a notice of the charges on which his dismissal is based
and an opportunity to present his defenses at a hearing.80
Whether the action of the local board or the appellate authorities within
the school system may be reviewed by the courts is an issue upon which the
courts have disagreed. Some courts hold that a decision of a properly con-
stituted board may be overruled only by a showing that it was arbitrary or
motivated by prejudice;87 others, that the teacher is entitled to a trial de 11ovo
after the board has acted; 88 and still others, that since the legislature need
not have accorded the dismissed teacher any rights at all, the decision of the
educational authorities is the performance of a ministerial function which
83. Stevenson, .spra, note 82 at 525.
84. People ex rel. Murphy v. Maxwell, 177 N. Y. 494, 69 N. E. 1092 (1904) ; School
City of Etwood v. State, 203 Ind. 626, 180 N. E. 471 (1932) ; cf. School Dist. No. 94
v. Gautier, 13 Okla. 194, 73 Pac. 954 (1903). Thompson v. Gibbs, 97 Tenn. 489, 37 S. W.
277 (1896).
85. See Scorr, op. cit. supra, note 78, at 33. Marriage has been held to constitute
"good cause" for dismissal under such a statute. Rinald v. Dreyer, Mass. Adv. Sheets
(1936) 843, (1936) 16 B. U. L. REv. 1011; Contra: People ex rel. Murphy v. Maxwell,
177 N. Y. 494, 69 N. E. 1092 (1904).
86. When a statute provides for dismissal only for cause, but does not require notice
and a hearing, such requirements may be implied. Morley v. Power, 78 Tenn. 219
(1882); Clark v. School Dist., 47 N. D. 297, 182 N. W. 307 (1921). If notice and a
hearing are required by statute, the teacher must be given a reasonable opportunity to
appear and defend himself. Hopkins v. Bucksport, 119 Me. 437, 111 Atl. 734 (1920).
And if dismissed without statutory notice and hearing the teacher may be entitled to his
salary regardless of the adequacX of the grounds of dismissal. Snyder v. School Dist.,
117 Pa. Super. Ct. 448, 178 AtI. 312 (1935) ; but cf. Bump v. Union High School Dist.,
144 Ore. 390, 24 P. (2d) 330 (1933).
87. Gragg v. Hill, 58 S. W. (2d) 150 (Te. Civ. App. 1933). Apparently this is
the rule in New York, O'Connor v. Emerson, 196 App. Div. 807, 188 N. Y. Supp. 236
(4th Dep't 1921) ; Matter of Epstein, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 19, 1936, p. 1756, col. 6, although
some cases seem to indicate that the decision of the Comm'r of Education is final, Levitch
v. Board of Education, 243 N. Y. 373, 153 N. E. 495 (1926). New York now has a
statute permitting the discharged teacher an election to pursue his remedies through the
educational system or to appeal to the courts on certiorari. EDUCATI N LAW § 872 (1930
Supp.)
88. See, e.g. Gardner v. Grossmont School Dist., 124 Cal. App. 686, 13 P. (2d)
401 (1932).
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may not be examined by the courtsYP On the whole, the courts are reluctant
to interfere; and even where judicial review is permitted, courts tend to give
great weight to the findings of the school authorities on facts and to pass
only upon the adequacy of those facts in law to sustain the dismissal.P' It is
noteworthy, however, that even in those jurisdictions where the courts profess
to confine the teacher's remedy to the educational system, they appear able
to prevent the imposition of unreasonable restraints by the school authorities.Y'
And when the action of the local school board is subject to review by the
courts as well as by appellate school authorities, the dismissed teacher is
granted an even greater opportunity to assert and protect his statutory rights.
Statutory provisions for a fair hearing upon carefully limited causes of
dismissal, however, are quite ineffective unless permanent tenure is granted by
statute to those teachers who have satisfactorily served a probationary period;
for protection from dismissal only during a short contract term is of little
value if the teacher is subject to summary dismissal at the end of that term.
In thirteen states,'either by state or municipal action, and in the District of
Columbia, some form' of permanent tenure legislation has been enacted which
gives the teacher a statutory right to hold his position until removed for one
of the causes by which his tenure has been expressly delimited, -0 2 and manda-
mus is available to compel his reinstatement if he has been wrongfully dis-
charged.93 Although the dismissal of teachers who- have been granted tenure
is quite rarePl the existence of tenure per se does not provide .the teacher
89. United States ex rel. Nalle v. Hoover, 31 App. D. C. 311 (1903); Draper v.
Comm'rs of Public Instruction, 66 N. J. Law 54, 48 AtL 556 (191I); cf. Arburn v.
Hunt, 207 Ind. 61, 191 N. E. 148 (1934); Board of School Comm'rs v. Manning, 123
Md. 169, 90 At. 839 (1914)..
90. State cx ref. Early v. Wunderlich, 144 Alinn. 36S, 175 N.W. 627 (1920);
Schrader v. Cameron School Dist, 266 N. W. 473 (Sup. Ct. Iowa, 1936). This is also
true of review of local board rulings by appeal bodies in the educational system. Wite
v. Readington, N. 3. State Education Report (1927) 87; Matter of McDowell v. Bd.
of Ed., 104 Misc. 564, 172 N. Y. Supp. 590 (Sup. Ct., 1918).
91. Thus, while denying the power to interfere with the local board's discretion, the
courts may review the evidence to determine whether the board has acted in an ar-
bitrary fashion. People ex rel. Murphy v. Maxwell, 177 N. Y. 494, 69 N. E. 1092 (1904);
Matter of Epstein, N. Y. L. J. Nov. 19, 1936, p. 1756, col. 6.
92. Scott, op. cit. mspra note 78, c. II; Teacher Tenure Legislation in 1935 to Date
(pamph., Nat. Ed. Ass'n, Washington, D. C., 1935).
93. It is said that a teacher, although not considered an officer, has a statutory
right to hold his job until properly dismissed. Kennedy v. Bd. of Ed, 82 Cal. 483, 22
Pac. 1042 (1890) ; People ex rel. Becker v. Bd. of Ed., 110 Misc. 537, 181 N. Y. Supp.
804 (Sup. Ct. 1920) ; Kostanzer v. State, 205 Ind. 536, 187 N. . 337 (1933).
94. Dismissal is so difficult under tenure statutes that complaint has been made
that such statutes give undesirable teachers a franchise in their positions. Broome,
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Permanent Tenure Law in Mew Jersey (1922)
University of Pa. Ninth Annual Schoolmen's Week Proceedings, pp. 226-7, cited in
Scort, op. cit. supra, note 78, at 51. From 1920 -to 1931 only nine educational Yorkers
with permanent status were dismissed in Chicago, id. at 52.
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with the optimum of academic and personal freedom. Local boards, hostile
to the theory of. tenure, many unduly extend the probationary period during
which the teacher is subject to extensive restraints.05 Furthermore, the flexi-
bility in the specification of causes justifying 'dismissal under the tenure
statutes leaves room for the exercise of arbitrary as well as sound discretion
by local boards.s8  Finally, although no detailed survey- of the actual cases
whict have prompted dismissal in the past is known to exist, judicial decisions
and the reports of state educational boards indicate that discharge in flagrant
violation of the principles of academic freedom is possible despite legis-
lative restraints. 97
95. Sherman v. Bd. of Trustees, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 262, 49 P. (2d) 350 (1935);
Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 64, 42 P. (2d) 397 (1935).
96. See ScoTT, op. cit. =Pra, note 78, at 33.
97. Matter of McDowell v. Bd. of Ed., 104 Misc. 564, 172 N.Y. Supp. 590 (Sup.
Ct. 1918) (denial of relief to a Quakeress teacher who had been dismissed for expressing
the view that she did not believe in war and would not encourage'her pupils to do Red
Cross work) ; cf. Matter of Appeal of Murfson, Schneer and Schmalhausen, 18 Report,
N. Y. State Dept. of Ed. 393 (1918) and Matter of Appeal of Pratt, 25 Report, N. Y.
State Dept of Ed. 65 (1921) (dismissal for communism).
